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Abstract
Identity-based encryption (IBE) systems are relatively recently proposed; yet they
are highly popular for messaging applications since they offer new features such
as certificateless infrastructure and anonymous communication. However, recent
studies also reveal that the infrastructure needed for IBE systems may be as com-
plicated as the conventional public key cryptosytems and not sufficient research has
been conducted in relevant issues concerning the infrastructure.
Firstly, there is the issue of the existence of the Private Key Generator(PKG) as a
full-trusted third party. Since PKG generates and knows users’ private keys; the user
privacy has not been fully achieved. This issue leads to non-repudiation problem
where PKG can not only decrypt messages but also can fabricate a valid signature
on behalf of any registered user. Secondly, the key-revocation leads tremendous cal-
culations for PKG. In the case of a key-lost, finding a descriptive identity for a user
may be difficult. Thus, a new master secret key is generated resulting in changing
private keys of every user registered in the system.
With this thesis, a new modified IBE infrastructure is proposed to overcome the
stated problems. The master key is secretly shared by two parties, Registration Au-
thority(RA) and Private Key Generator(PKG). In addition, PKG shares the master
key with every registered user. With this approach, PKG will not be able to ac-
quire the master key provided that there will be no collusion between the parties,
RA-PKG and PKG-users.
vi
O¨zet
Kimlik tabanımlı s¸ifreleme(KTS¸) sistemleri; yeni sunulmalarına kars¸ın, sertifikasız
yapılar ve anonim haberles¸melerde yeni o¨zellikler sundug˘u du¨s¸u¨nu¨lerek, mesajlas¸ma
programlarında popu¨leritesini git gide arttırmaktadır. Buna rag˘men, yeni aras¸tırmalar
go¨steriyor ki; KTS¸ sistemleri, ac.ık anahtarlama kriptoloji sistemleri kadar kompleks
bir yapılandırma gerektirmekte ve bu konuda aras¸tırmalar halen su¨regelmektedir.
O¨ncelikle, KTS¸ sistemlerindeki Gizli Anahtar u¨reticisi biriminin tam gu¨venilir bir
durumda olması probleminin u¨zerinde durulması gerekiyor. Gizli Anahtar u¨reticisi
sistemdeki tu¨m kullanıcıların gizli anahtarlarını olus¸turmaktan sorumlu olmasından
ve bu deg˘erleri bilmesinden dolayı kullanıcı gizlilig˘i KTS¸ sistemlerinde tam olarak
sag˘lanamamaktadır. Bu durum aynı zamanda kullanıcılar ic¸in inkar edememe prob-
lemini olus¸turmakta olup, Gizli Anahtar U¨reticisinin sistemde kayıtlı olan herhangi
bir kullanıcı adına imza u¨retebilme ve kullanıcıların mesajlarını des¸ifre etmesine
olanak sag˜lamaktadır. I˙kinci olarak, anahtar gec¸ersiz kılma is¸lemleri Gizli Anahtar
U¨reticisi biriminde as¸ırı hesaplamalara ve is¸ yu¨ku¨ne neden olmaktadır. Kullanıcıların
anahtar kaybetmesi durumunda, kullanıcıya atanacak ac¸ıklayıcı bir kimlik bulmak
zorluklar getirmektedir. Bu sorunu ortadan kaldırmak ic¸in, yapılması gereken sis-
temdeki ana anahtarın tekrar u¨retilmesi ve dolayısıyla tu¨m kullanıcılar ic¸in yeniden
yeni ana anahtar kullanılarak gizli anahtar olus¸turulması gerekmektedir.
Sunulan bu tezle birlikte, Kimlik tabanımlı sistemlerdeki daha o¨nceden bahsedilmis¸
olan sorunlara c¸o¨zu¨m yolu bulunmus¸tur. Sistem ana anahtarı iki birimde, Kayıt
Otoritesi(RA) ve Gizli Anahtar U¨reticisi(PKG), gizli bir s¸ekilde paylas¸tırılmıs¸tır.
Aynı s¸ekilde sistem ana anahtarı Gizli Anahtar U¨reticisi ile sistemde kayıtlı olan her
kullanıcı arasında paylas¸tırılmıs¸ olup, kullanıcı gizlilig˘i sag˘lanmıs¸tır. Bu yaklas¸ımla;
kullanıcıların Gizli Anahtar U¨reticisi ve Kayıt Otoritesinin Gizli Anahtar U¨reticisiyle
hic¸ bir s¸ekilde anlas¸maması s¸artıyla, Gizli Anahtar U¨retici hic¸ bir zaman ana anahtar
bilgisine ulas¸amamaktadır.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme is a public key cryptosystem where the
public keys are unique identities in arbitrary string forms. For instance, e-mail
addresses, names, pseudonyms or IP addresses can serve as a public key in IBE sys-
tems. The original concept was initially introduced by Shamir in 1984 [17] while the
first practical realization of IBE system is based on pairing-based cryptography by
Boneh and Franklin [1]. With the advent of pairing-based cryptography new appli-
cations of IBE cryptosystem as well as new techniques to realize it more efficiently
become the major focus of the contemporary research.
Generally speaking, in IBE cryptosystems, there exists a trusted third party,
so-called Private Key Generator(PKG), which is responsible for generating global
parameters to be employed in the system as well as the private keys for the registered
users. Users obtain their private keys from the PKG, in order to decrypt their
messages intended for them. The secure delivery of private keys should be performed
over secure channels, where confidentiality and authentication are provided.
IBE is principally a public key cryptosystem, where each user has a public and
private key pair. To illustrate, suppose that a user, Alice, wants to send a message
to Bob. She encrypts the message with Bob’s unique public key, e.g. his e-mail
address ‘bob@sabanciuniv.edu’. Bob requests the corresponding private key from
the PKG, to decrypt the message. The PKG calculates the private key, sends to
Bob, and Bob consequently decrypts the message.
Since the bound between a user and its public key is based on an inherent or real-
word relationship (e.g. user/name, user/e-mail address, user/assumed role etc.), the
need for an infrastructure is seen by some not as comprehensive as the conventional
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public key infrastructure(PKI). Whereas as elaborately pointed out in [6], a fully-
functional IBE system would also require a complex infrastructure in which some
aspects have not been fully investigated. Firstly, there is the issue of uniqueness
of public keys in IBE since real world names or identities tend to be not unique.
Therefore, there should be a registration authority to keep track of used names, i.e.
public keys. Secondly, the key revocation could lead to some inconvenience since one
may find difficult to obtain a new descriptive name for herself such as finding a new
name. One way to revoke a key without actually changing the public key requires
that system parameters be changed resulting in changing of private key of every
user in the system. And finally, all IBE schemes have the key escrowing property,
which is considered as a weakness since the PKG knows the private key of every
user. Thus, the PKG can decrypt any message intended for any user and it can
fabricate a signature for any message on behalf of any user. The former results in
the loss of privacy and anonymity of users in their communications while the latter
leads to loss of non-repudiation property.
In this thesis, our contribution is proposing solutions to some of the shortcom-
ings of IBE systems. Limiting our attention to messaging systems such as instant
messaging and e-mail applications, we outline an infrastructure for IBE system.
Our basic construction follows the idea of secret sharing of the master secret key
between two semi-honest parties, namely the private key generator (PKG) and the
registration authority (RA). In addition, the PKG shares the same master secret
key with each user in a different way, having one share for each user registered in
the system. Thus, a user and the PKG have to participate in a protocol to generate
the private key for the user. A user’s only interaction with the RA is during the
registration phase, in which the RA not only checks the uniqueness of the identity
but also assists in the protocol that generates two new shares of the master secret
key for the user and the PKG. One benefit of our model is that there is no need to
employ a secure channel between the PKG and users to deliver private keys since
the PKG can send only its share of the private key to users.
We also propose to use ever-changing public keys by attaching date information
to the natural identities of users from the perspective of communication models.
While public keys changing on daily basis are convenient for instant messaging
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applications, weekly or monthly public keys in case of asynchronous persistent com-
munication models such as e-mail systems seems feasible. The PKG’s share of the
relevant public key is sent to user automatically. The PKG does not need to be
a global party in the system; there can be many local PKGs serving intranets or
subdomains. For instance, the message exchange server is a candidate for a local
PKG.
In our infrastructure, the users can freely adopt pseudonyms or nicknames for
anonymous communication. The hardness of elliptic curve discrete logarithm prob-
lem protects the anonymity of users from the scrutiny of the PKG or any other
party.
Our most basic assumption is that the RA and PKG never collude since they are
semi-honest and follows the protocol steps exactly. Similarly, we also assume that a
user and the PKG do not collude since we believe that there are many incentives for
users not to collude with the PKG such as losing their privacy and/or anonymity if
they do so.
We give a brief information about identity-based encryption systems and their
mathematical background in the second section. The third part includes detailed
information about our proposed infrastructure and the security of the proposed
scheme is discussed in section four. In section five, the implementation of the pro-
posed infrastructure is explained. Finally, the thesis ends up with the conclusion
section.
3
Chapter 2
Identity-Based Encryption Systems
2.1 Background
Identity-based encryption (IBE) systems utilize elliptic curves and pairing opera-
tions as proposed in [1]. The public and private keys, as well as the ciphers are
represented as elliptic curve points and the pairing function is performed during
encryption and decryption processes. The underlying infrastructure of elliptic curve
cryptography is built on finite fields. It is essential to point out some informa-
tion about the background and underlying key terms utilized in the proposed IBE
infrastructure.
2.1.1 Public Key Cryptography
Public-key Cryptography(Asymmetric Cryptography) is a form of cryptography
where users are assigned a pair of keys, public and private keys. While public key
information is widely distributed, the private key is kept secretly on the user side.
Generally, the messages are encrypted with the recipient’s public key and can only
be decrypted with the corresponding private key pair belonging to the recipient.
2.1.2 Elliptic Curve Cryptography
Elliptic Curve Cryptography is an approach to Public Key Cryptography and built
on elliptic curves. The security of the system is directly correlated with the proper-
ties of the Finite Field and the Elliptic Curve that are in used in the implementation
of the elliptic curve cryptography. Since the system is built on elliptic curves, vari-
ables, i.e. public, private keys or messages, are represented as elliptic curve points.
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Besides, in the decryption and encryption phases, elliptic curve operations are per-
formed.
2.1.3 Secret Sharing Method
As mentioned in the Introduction section, in order to avoid drawbacks of IBE, a
secret sharing method will be utilized between both RA-PKG and PKG-users. With
secret sharing, a secret information is shared between parties and each share is stored
secretly. While the shares stored on each party do not reveal any information about
the shared secret key, the only way to constitute the key is to apply a method where
all users must participate. In our infrastructure, the master key will be secretly
shared by RA-PKG and PKG-Users. The algorithm of the the secret sharing method
will be discussed in section three.
2.1.4 Finite Fields
A field is an algebraic structure, where operations like addition, subtraction, multi-
plication and division are performed. A finite field or Galois field, Fp or GF (p), is
a form of a field that has finitely many elements. The properties of the finite field
are explained below:
• The Finite Fields have the form F np , where p is the the characteristic property
and n is the order of the field.
• The number of elements in the field is equal to pn.
2.1.5 Elliptic Curves
An elliptic curve E(Fp) over a finite field Fp is defined with the equation,
y2 = x3 + ax+ b with a, b ∈ Fp
The solutions to this equation are called elliptic curve points, and shown as P =
(x, y), where x and y are the coordinates and elements of the underlying field Fp.
The points on elliptic curve along with so-called point at infinity form an additive
group that we can use to define elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. We can
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denote the point addition as P +Q, and define elliptic curve scalar multiplication of
an elliptic curve point P by an integer α, as αP . The order of a point is the smallest
integer, n, such that nP = O , where O denotes the point at infinity, which is the
identity element of the elliptic curve group. The security of elliptic curves depends
on the difficulty of solving elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP). The
ECDLP basically states that given two points Q and P from the equation, Q = αP ,
it is computationally difficult to find α.
2.1.6 Bilinear Map Functions
Bilinear maps over elliptic curve points play a central role in IBE systems. A bilinear
map is defined over two groups of the same prime-order q denoted by G1 and G2.
G1 is an additive group and is formed of a group of points on elliptic curves while
G2 is a multiplicative group. Bilinear map, therefore, is defined as G1 × G1 → G2.
Basically, a bilinear map, which is denoted as eˆ(·, ·), accepts two elements as input
from G1 and returns an element in G2. Bilinear maps have three properties [7]:
• Bilinearity
eˆ(xP, yQ) = eˆ(xP, yQ) = eˆ(P,Q)xy ∀P,Q ∈ G1,∀x, y ∈ Zq
• Non-degeneracy: The elements of G1, except O are mapped to all elements in
G2.
∀P ⊂ G1, P 6= 0⇒ eˆ(P, P ) 6= 1
• Computability: eˆ is efficiently computable.
Tate and Weil pairings [13], [8] are the most used pairing functions. Several recent
cryptographic schemes utilizes these pairings such as identity-based encryption [1],
short signature [3], and efficient broadcast encryption [2]. Our scheme is based on
Tate pairing which is, in general, more efficiently calculated than the Weil pairing.
2.1.7 Hash Functions
Private keys of users, in IBE systems, are elliptic curve points. Similarly, the iden-
tities are mapped to elliptic curve points using a public function. A hash function,
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H1 : {0.1}
∗ → G1, is employed to convert a string of arbitrary length (i.e. identity)
to a point on the underlying elliptic curve. In addition to H1, another hash func-
tion, H2 : G2 → {0, 1}
n is used in encryption and decryption phases. For further
information about elliptic curves and pairing based cryptography one can profitably
refer to [11] and [5].
2.1.8 Homomorphic Encryption
In the proposed infrastructure; Homomorphic Encryption algorithm is used, espe-
cially in the registration phase, in order to apply the secret sharing method for the
user and the PKG. The Homomorphic Encryption algorithm works as follows:
E(m1)∗E(m2) = E(m1+m2) where m1 and m2 are the encrypted messages. (2.1)
2.2 Work flow of IBE
In general, an IBE System consists of four phases [15]:
1. Setup phase: consists of two steps and is performed by the PKG.
• Selection of the elliptic curve and the master key, s, and the generation
of the public key of the system, PSY S = sP , where P is the generator
point of G1, group of chosen elliptic curve.
• Selection of hash functions, H1, H2 and the bilinear mapping function.
2. Extraction: The private key generator generates the users’ private. The
public key of a user, having the identity, ID, is denoted as QID while the
private key of the user is denoted as DID.
QA = H1(A) and DA = sQA where A stands for the identity of Alice
3. Encryption: Encryption is performed by using the receiver’s public key (say
Alice) as follows:
• (U, V ) = (rP,M ⊕H2(gQ))
7
• where r ∈R Z
∗
q (i.e. r is randomly selected in Zq)
• and gQ = eˆ(QA, PSY S)
r and ⊕ denotes exclusive-OR operation.
Here M is the plaintext and the pair (U, V ) is the ciphertext, which is conse-
quently sent to Alice.
4. Decryption: In decryption phase, the ciphertext (U, V ) can only be de-
crypted if the receiver’s private key (DA) is known. The following steps are
applied in decryption process:
V ⊕H2(gQ′) where gQ′ = eˆ(DA, U)
The decryption works since
V ⊕H2(eˆ(DA, U)) = V ⊕H2(eˆ(sQA, rP )) = V ⊕H2(eˆ(rQA, sP ))
= V ⊕H2(eˆ(QA, PSY S)
r)
= V ⊕H2(gQ) =M ⊕H2(gQ)⊕H2(gQ) =M.
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Chapter 3
The Proposed Infrastructure
This section describes the main steps in the proposed infrastructure omitting the
encryption and decryption phases since they are identical to the original IBE en-
cryption and decryption schemes outlined in the previous section.
3.1 Setup Phase
RA PKG
 selects s
RA 
at random
P
RA
 = s
RA
P
 selects s
PKG 
at random
P
PKG
 = s
PKG
P
P
SYS
 = P
PKG
+P
RA
 publishes P
SYS
Figure 3.1: The two-party protocol for computing PSY S
We utilize secret sharing of the master key, s. With this purpose, two semi-
honest parties1 are formed; the Private Key Generator (PKG) and the Registration
Authority (RA). The RA is responsible for the registration of users in the beginning
while the PKG is responsible for the distribution of private keys. In addition, the
RA and PKG share the master secret key as follows: Initially, the RA and the PKG
choose two random secret keys, sRA and sPKG, where s = sRA+ sPKG is the master
1A semi-honest party follows the protocol steps exactly as defined, and does not involve in
extra-protocol activities. This is somewhat a weaker assumption than the fully-trusted authority.
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key. Since s must not be known by two semi-honest parties, we stipulate that the
RA and the PKG do not collude with each other. Indeed, so long as the PKG and
the RA do not collude nobody knows the master secret key. A two-party protocol
for generating the secret share and the public key of the system PSY S is illustrated
in Figure 3.1.
After selecting its secret share of master secret key, the RA computes PRA =
sRAP , which is its share of public key of the system, and sends it to the PKG.
Similarly, the PKG computes its share of system public key, PPKG = sPKGP and
performs the elliptic curve addition PSY S = PPKG + PRA. Consequently, the PKG
publishes the system public key, PSY S.
3.2 Registration phase
Alice RA PKG
1) A, X = E
RA
[r
1
-s
A
]
2) Y = E
PKG
[r
1
-s
A
+s
RA
+r
2
]
3) Z = E
PKG
[-s
A
+s
RA
+r
2
], E
PKG
[s
A
P]
 D
RA
[r
1
-s
A
]
r
1 
- s
A 
+ s
RA
+r
2
E
PKG
[-r
1
]*Y
D
PKG
[T*E
PKG
[s
PKG
]]=s-s
A
D
PKG
[E
PKG
[s
A
P]]=s
A
P
4) T = E
PKG
[-s
A
+s
RA
], E
PKG
[s
A
P]
E
PKG
[-r
2
]*E
PKG
[-s
A
+s
RA
+r
2
]
Figure 3.2: The registration protocol
In the registration phase, the user is first introduced to the system by a secure
three-party protocol that involves the user, the RA, and the PKG. The aim of the
three-party protocol is two-fold: i) check the uniqueness of the user identity, and
ii) securely compute new shares of the master secret and give one share to the user
and the other to the PKG. The protocol steps are illustrated in Figure 3.2. The
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registration phase utilizes public key cryptography and we assume that the user
(i.e. Alice in Figure 3.2) knows the public keys of the RA and PKG. ERA[x] and
EPKG[x] stand for encryption of x with public key of the corresponding party, i.e. the
public keys of RA and PKG, respectively. The PKG uses a homomorphic public key
cryptosystem similar to the one in [16]. Therefore, we have EPKG[m1] ·EPKG[m2] =
EPKG[m1 +m2].
The protocol steps are explained as follows:
• Step 1 The user (Alice in Figure 3.2), for the first and last time, contacts
the RA by sending her identity (A) in the first message. Alice also encrypts
the difference between her secret share sA and a random number r1 using the
public key of the RA and sends the resulting ciphertext X = ERA[r1 − sA]
along with her identity A to the RA.
• Step 2 The RA first checks whether the ID of Alice, A is unique; if not, it
helps Alice choose a unique identity. It then obtains the difference r1 − sA by
decrypting X and adds its own share of the master secret, sRA and another
random number r2 to the difference. It, subsequently, encrypts r1−sA+sRA+r2
and sends the resulting ciphertext Y = EPKG[r1−sA+sRA+r2] back to Alice.
The value r2 is a random number chosen by the RA.
• Step 3 Alice removes the random number r1 by performing the operation
EPKG[r1− sA + sRA + r2]×EPKG[−r1] = EPKG[sRA− sA + r2]. The resulting
ciphertext EPKG[sRA− sA+ r2] is sent to the RA. Alice also sends EPKG[sAP ]
to the RA, which serves as a token to authenticate Alice to the PKG in their
subsequent transactions.
• Step 42 The RA removes the random number r2 similarly and forwardEPKG[sRA−
sA] to the PKG which first performs EPKG[sRA−sA]×EPKG[sPKG] = EPKG[s−
sA]. It then decrypts the resulting ciphertext and obtain its share of master
secret sA′. Note that s = sA + sA′. The PKG also decrypts EPKG[sAP ]
and obtains sAP . Finally, it checks whether the following equality holds:
sAP + sA′P = PSY S.
2Step 4 of the registration protocol is more complicated than described here due to security
considerations. The full description of this step is given in Section 4.2
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As a result of the registration phase, the user and the PKG come to posses differ-
ent shares of the master secret s. Therefore, a user and the PKG must collaborate to
generate a private key corresponding to any public key chosen by the user. The fact
that they collaborate makes the generation and secure transmission of private key
to the user simpler and more efficient as explained in subsequent sections. Provided
that none of the users and the PKG do not collude, the master secret will never be
revealed. Note that no coalition of users is able to construct the master secret since
the user shares themselves do not contain any information about the master secret.
We have two motivations to believe that non-collusion assumption is valid and
realistic: i) the PKG is semi-honest, and therefore does not try to learn about the
secret shares of the users unless openly told by the users, and ii) a user does not
want to reveal its share to the PKG since doing so gives the PKG the ability to
access the messages intended for the user and to generate signatures on behalf of
the user. Furthermore, the secret share sA of a user can always be kept in a trusted
zone of its hardware and will never leave this zone in the clear. And, we can prevent
the user from learning the secret share by employing tamper-proof crypto module
as explained in Section 4.2.
3.3 Public Key Selection and Private Key Extrac-
tion
In identity-based encryption system, public keys are generally arbitrary strings that
contain identity of the user and other relevant publicly available information. Fur-
thermore, the public keys can contain descriptive information about the intended
recipient. This clearly alleviates the problem of public key certification used to
establish a binding between the public key and the identity of public key owner.
Apparently, this bond is inherent in IBE systems. This, nevertheless, complicates
the key revocation problem since changing a user’s public key entails changing of
its identity. Changing one’s identity raises certain concerns since finding another
descriptive name for an individual may be difficult per se. However, the more im-
portant point is the complicated infrastructure (e.g. certification revocation lists)
required for informing other users on the compromised or stale public keys.
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In messaging applications, on the other hand, the problem of key revocation can
be addressed using ”ever-changing” public keys. Namely, public key of a user can
contain strings related to situational information such as the location, time, date,
and role of the user besides the unique identity of the user. We simply propose
to include date (or time) information in the identity (hence the public key) of the
user. Therefore, the users in our messaging infrastructure has public keys, that are
updated frequently. For instance, a user ID may contain date information, such as
March 14, 2008, which is a public information and can be appended to the ID easily.
The string ”bob@openuniv.edu:14/03/2008” is an example for ever-changing public
keys.
If the public keys change as frequently as every day, then the corresponding
private keys must be re-computed as frequently. As mentioned earlier, both the
user and the PKG must participate in the private key generation procedure. In
classical IBE systems, the secret key is generated by the PKG and then securely
transmitted to the user. Before, the key generation, the user must authenticate
itself to the PKG and secure channel must be established between the user and the
PKG. Otherwise, the private key can be fallen in the hands of other users or worse
yet adversaries. The proposed scheme, on the other hand, utilizes only implicit
authentication of the user and does not require a secure channel. The private key
generation scheme is illustrated in Figure 3.3.
The user, Alice, selects a public key by appending date and other relevant infor-
mation to her identity and obtains QA, which is sent to the PKG. The PKG then
computes its share of the public key sA′ ·QA and sends it to Alice. Alice then com-
putes DA = sA ·QA + sA′ ·QA = s ·QA, which is her private key, DA corresponding
to the public key QA.
3.4 Identification
In case there is a need for explicit identification of the user to the PKG, they can use
a modified version of Schnorr’s identification protocol as illustrated in Figure 3.4.
The effort undertaken by the user is one elliptic curve point multiplication with a
scalar and one multiplication and one subtraction in modulo n, where n is the order
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Figure 3.4: User Identification to the PKG
of base point P .
The steps of the identification protocol are summarized below:
• Step 1 The user Alice, first selects a random integer k and performs the elliptic
curve scalar multiplication, kP , where P is the base point for the underlying
elliptic curve group. Alice sends kP to the PKG as a witness.
• Step 2 The PKG selects a random integer r and sends it to Alice as a challenge.
• Step 3 Alice, upon reception of r, computes y ≡ k − sAr (mod n) and send
the resulting value y to the PKG.
• Step 4 The PKG computes yP − rsAP , where sAP serves as the public key
of Alice obtained during the registration, and authenticate Alice if the result
is the same as the witness kP .
If the PKG needs to authenticate itself to Alice, they can use any identification
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scheme utilizing the public key of the PKG which is assumed to be in possession of
Alice.
3.5 Using Pseudonyms for Anonymity
The users, for anonymity reasons, may want to use nicknames or so-called pseudonyms
in their interaction with other users in the system. In the classical setting of IBE
systems, the PKG knows both the public key (identity) and private key of every
user; hence the anonymity cannot be achieved. One simple trick can, however, help
users generate pseudonyms on their own without a help from the PKG. Recall that
a user, say Alice, has public and private keys, QA and DA = sQA where s is the
master secret key. Alice can select a random number k, calculates RA = kQA, and
declares RA as her pseudonym. Alice also calculates kDA and uses it as her new
private key in decryption and signing operations. A similar approach is taken in
[10], where users can compute their private keys without any assistance from the
PKG. One important problem, however, associated with this technique is that the
pseudonyms are meaningless random looking bit-strings. Although pseudonyms in
this scheme tend do be unique they are also hard to remember. This may be a
concern in certain applications such as messaging where nicknames are specifically
chosen to be easy-to-remember.
Our approach is based on a technique we call blinding of the pseudonyms. As
illustrated in Figure 3.5, after selecting a pseudonym, QPN , Alice blinds it by per-
forming elliptic curve scalar multiplication, kQPN , where k is the randomly selected
blinding factor. The resulting blinded point QBL is then sent to the PKG that com-
putes sA′QBL and sends it back to Alice. Alice, finally, computes k
−1(sA′QBL) +
sAQPN = sQPN . Consequently, Alice declares QPN (or more specifically PN) as
her public key and uses DPN = sQPN as her private key.
Note that no other party including the PKG and the RA can discover the identity
of the user in the proposed anonymity protocol since they do not have the knowledge
of the users private keys under the non-collusion assumption. Blinding does not fully
achieve the anonymity in the classical setting where the PKG is able to compute
the private key corresponding to any given pseudonym. Therefore, the PKG can
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Figure 3.5: Pseudonym generation
decrypt any message being exchanged in the classical setting. However, in the
proposed protocol the PKG and RA needs to collaborate to compute a private key,
which they will do when a legitimate need arises such as revoking the pseudonym
of an ill-behaving user.
Another issue with the anonymity is the uniqueness of chosen pseudonyms. As
pointed out in [6], having two users sharing the same pseudonym will result in the
loss of security and privacy. Thus, users should check whether it is available before
they adopt a pseudonym. One solution to this problem is that the RA publishes an
authentic list of used pseudonyms. The users check the pseudonym against this list
and notify the RA that the chosen pseudonym is no longer available if it is not in the
list. The RA, in turn, updates the list of used pseudonyms. In certain applications
users may not want the RA to know the used pseudonyms. In this case, the RA
keeps a list for the hash values of the used pseudonyms and users can decide if a
pseudonym is used by performing the comparison over the hash values3.
Another issue using pseudonyms is that there is still a risk that a user may take
a pseudonym which is already adopted by another user; a problem which exists in
other pseudonym-based schemes as well. Since we do not explicitly address this
problem, the protocol in Figure 3.5 does not prevent users from adopting other
3If the so-called dictionary attack is of a concern, we may require that the RA perform the
uniqueness check. Having a semi-honest RA which never involves in extra protocol activities we
assume that it does not apply the dictionary attack. Alternatively, the RA can utilize a secure
comparison protocol.
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users’ pseudonyms. Instead, a three-party protocol between user, the RA, and the
PKG is to be developed to ensure that the users register with unique pseudonyms.
A sketch of the protocol, which is based on the one outlined in Figure 3.5 can be
given as follows: User anonymously contacts with RA and sends QPN value. The
RA checks if another user has already registered with the same QPN ; if not, the
blinding operation is performed by multiplying QPN with a random value of k, the
result is digitally signed with the RA’s signature and sent together with k back to
the user. In the following step, the user sends (kQPN)sign to the PKG that verifies
the RA’s signature. If the signature is verified, the PKG computes sA′kQPN and
sends the result back to the user. The received sA′kQPN value is multiplied with
k−1 and sA′QPN is obtained on the user side. Finally; user’s private key, sQPN , is
calculated by adding sAQPN and sA′QPN . Since our primary application area is that
of e-mail, where pseudonyms are not used, a secure pseudonym-creation protocol for
other messaging applications requires further effort and security analysis depending
on the applications’ requirements.
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Chapter 4
Analysis of the Proposed Infrastructure
In this section, we analyze the proposed infrastructure from four different perspec-
tives, namely i) security, ii) non-repudiation, iii) validity of public keys, and iv) key
revocation.
4.1 Security
Employing two or more trusted parties that do not collude was already proposed by
Boneh and Franklin in [1] and also in [4]. In both schemes, a user has to contact all
trusted parties to obtain its private key and furthermore the user has to establish
a secure channel with each trusted party in this key extraction phase. Our scheme
diverges from the previous schemes in two aspects. Firstly, it introduces two trusted-
third parties, the private key generator (PKG) and the registration authority (RA),
which secret share the master secret s and again do not collude with each other.
Secondly, each user shares the same master secret with the PKG in a different way.
Therefore, a user does not need to contact both trusted parties to acquire his/her
private key since s/he can do so using a protocol involving itself and the PKG
(cf. Figure 3.3). Furthermore, the communication between the user and the PKG
does not need to be encrypted. Users do not wish to collude with the PKG since
otherwise would mean the loss of their privacy and/or anonymity in their messaging
transactions.
Our second assumption involves the semi-honest nature of the PKG and the RA.
We do not make any assumption on the users of the system; they only try to protect
their own interest. Property of semi-honest party was first introduced by Goldreich
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in [9] and it simply assumes that such parties are honest but curious. In other
words, they do not participate in extra protocol activities but gather any leaked
information from the protocol. For instance, the PKG will never try to register as
a user in the system since this would compromise the master secret to the PKG.
The interface for user registration is not available to the PKG. Unless users openly
encrypt their private shares of the master secret with the public key of the PKG
and send it to the PKG the semi-honest PKG will never learn the private shares of
the users. A user will not reveal his/her private share to the PKG or RA since this
share also serves as his/her private key in the identification protocol illustrated in
Figure 3.4. In other words, a user should not collude with the PKG since doing so
will enable the PKG to calculate the master secret s.
Another advantage of the proposed infrastructure is that it provides convenience
in key distribution. Only assumption we hold in key distribution is that a user who
would like to register knows the public keys of the PKG and RA. Users can acquire
this knowledge from publicly available resources such as web pages. Furthermore, a
user does not necessarily authenticate oneself to the PKG to obtain the private key
since the value sent by the PKG, i.e. sA′QA, does not contain any information on
the private key of the user. The information sent by the PKG becomes useful only
if it is received by the intended user.
Considering the difficulty of initial identification of users during the registration
as pointed out in [6], we assume that the user is able to prove her identity to the
RA during the registration protocol. It could be the case where the user personally
goes to the RA and show a piece of identification to prove her identity.
4.2 Non-Repudiation
Non-repudiation, by which a user cannot deny her own transactions with the other
entities in the system, is a property almost non-existent in IBE systems. Our in-
frastructure provides the non-repudiation property under certain assumptions. The
first assumption is non-collusion assumption between the PKG and the RA, and a
user and the PKG. Since a user’s share of the master secret serves also her private
key in her interaction with the PKG, such as identification protocol, she can be held
19
responsible for protecting her share from compromise as in the case of private key in
conventional public key cryptosystems. However, a user can claim that some other
user compromises his own share to the PKG not her and that the PKG becomes
able to sign messages for every user (hence the loss of non-repudiation). If this is
the case, our infrastructure reduces to classical IBE system. However, the situation
with our infrastructure is indeed better than the classical IBE systems since a user’s
ability to compromise her share of master secret to the PKG can be constrained.
One way of doing it is to employ a trusted tamper-proof crypto module that op-
erates on the secret share of the user and performs all the functions in a protected
manner. This module or engine will have a certain interface to the outside appli-
cations that can be designed not to leak information on user’s share of the master
secret. It should be noted that we only try to prevent the leakage on the user’s
share since its compromise to the PKG will destroy the non-repudiation property
of the whole system. Therefore, the primary goal in providing the non-repudiation
property is to ensure correct functioning of the system against the disruptive user
activities.
There are five instances that a user makes calls to the crypto module’s functions
that involve her secret share:
1. ERA[r1 − sA] in registration phase (cf. Figure 3.2).
2. EPKG[−r1]× EPKG[r1 − sA + sRA] in registration phase (cf. Figure 3.2).
3. DA = sAQA + sA′QA in private key extraction phase (cf. Figure 3.3).
4. y = k − sAr in user identification phase in Figure 3.4.
5. sA′QBL/k + sAQPN in pseudonym generation (cf. Figure 3.5)
In instance 1, only the difference of the share sA to a random value chosen by the
module leaves the module; hence it leaks no information on sA. In instance 4, a zero
knowledge protocol is used, which was proved to leak no information on the secret
value. In instances 3 and 5, sA leaves the module as the multiple of an elliptic curve
point. This value also does not leak any information based on hardness of ECDLP.
In instance 2, the user can call EPKG[−r1]×EPKG[r1−sA+sRA+r2]×EPKG[sRA] if
it obtains EPKG[sRA], which will never be available to her. However, the registration
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phase must be inspected more closely to reveal the attack possibilities, which we do
in the following.
The user may cause the share sA to be revealed to herself or the PKG by chang-
ing the public keys used in the registration protocol. Assuming that the user is
capable of changing both public keys, she applies the man-in-the-middle-attack in
the registration phase and learns sA as illustrated in Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: Man-in-the-middle attack when user changes the public keys of the RA
and the PKG
The user makes the crypto module to use a different public key with which she
encrypts r1−sA and returns the ciphertextX
′. After having decrypted the ciphertext
X ′ and obtained r1 − sA, the user re-encrypts it using the RA’s real public key and
forwards the ciphertext X to the RA. The RA responds to this message in usual way
and sends Y to the user, who replaces it with Y ′. The ciphertext Y ′ is the ciphertext
of r1− sA encrypted under another public key which the crypto module treats it as
the authentic public key of the PKG. However, this public key is in fact chosen by
the user who naturally knows the corresponding private key. The user decrypts Z ′
and obtains the secret share sA; since she also knows r1 − sA, the user is able to
recover r1 as well. The user performs EPKG(−r1)× EPKG(r1 − sA + sRA + r2) and
sends the result EPKG(−sA + sRA + r2) to the RA. Therefore, we must prevent the
user from changing the public keys employed in the crypto module. A tamper-proof
and trusted crypto module can have hardcoded public keys, or public keys which
can be changed by only authorized users. The remaining questions to resolve is that
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whether we protect both public keys or only one of them.
If the user is able to change only one of the public keys then the situation will
require another two analysis. Firstly, assume that the user can change only the
public key of the RA. Then the man-in-the-middle-attack works as in Figure 4.2.
As can be observed from the figure, the user herself cannot recover the secret share
sA, but enables the PKG to do so when the PKG decrypts EPKG(−sA). Note that
the user has to use the correct public key of the PKG since we assume that it cannot
replace it.
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Figure 4.2: Man-in-the-middle attack when user is able to change only the public
key of the RA
Finally, in case the user is able to change only the public key of the PKG, since
the RA and the hardware module use different public keys no information is revealed
to anyone. Therefore, if the user is not able to change the public key of the RA, then
the two attacks described above cannot be applied. Therefore, it is sufficient that
the tamper-proof crypto module must prevent the user from changing the public
key of the RA.
Another type of attack that can be applied by anyone who knows the two public
keys is called query attack and depicted in Figure 4.3, wherein the secret share of
the RA is revealed to the PKG. To prevent this attack, Step 4 of the registration
protocol (cf. Figure 3.2) must be modified as in Figure 4.4.
In the modified version of Step 4, the RA does not immediately remove its
random number r2 after it receives the message Z from the user. Instead, it relays
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Figure 4.3: Query Attack on the RA
Z to the PKG that decrypts it and obtains −sA+sRA+r2 (or sRA+r2 in case query
attack is applied). The secret share of the RA sRA is protected by the random
number r2 even if the query attack is applied. The PKG performs elliptic curve
point multiplication of the base point P by the integer −sA+sRA+r2 and sends the
resulting elliptic curve point Z ′ to the RA. The RA in turn computes (−sA+ sRA+
r2)P − r2P = (−sA + sRA)P , which would be sRAP in case of the query attack.
Therefore, the RA can detect the query attack when Z ′ − r2P is equal to sRAP ;
if this is the case it aborts the registration protocol. Otherwise, it continues with
regular execution of the step 4 of the registration protocol as described in Figure
3.2.
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Figure 4.4: Secured Version of Step 4 of Registration Protocol
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One can claim that the registration protocol is complicated and may take quite
a long time. However, this complication can be tolerated since it is executed only
once for each user initially or in case of secret share refreshment which occurs not
very frequently. On the other hand, our private key generation and distribution
protocols are very efficient and convenient.
In summary, it is not possible to provide non-repudiation in IBE systems with-
out a tamper-proof crypto module that protects the secret share of the users and
public key of the RA used in the registration protocol. Best way to implement a
tamper-proof crypto module is doing it in the hardware whereby there are many
techniques to guarantee the protected and secure execution of cryptographic primi-
tives. Software obfuscation methods to hide secret keys and protect the public key
of the RA against replacement can also be used to provide a similar protection.
However, obfuscation methods are proven to give way to certain attack types; they
only provide limited protection.
4.3 Validity Period of Public Keys
Another issue in the proposed infrastructure is the validity duration of users’ public
keys. As mentioned earlier, we propose to append date information to IDs of the
users. The issue then becomes what sort of date information to use in the IDs. Our
approach is to define the duration, depending on the application and the underlying
communication model used in the message exchange. For instance, we propose to
append day information to the IDs in instant messaging applications where users
must be on-line and the communication is transient. The user acquires the PKG’s
part of the belonging private key in the first login in that day and it computes the
private key, which expires next day.
For asynchronous messaging systems such as e-mail, where users are most of the
time off-line, we propose to use either date of current week or month information
appended to users ID. We believe that to change the public key of the user every
week does not constitute too much overhead in e-mail applications. Considering
many e-mail messages an average user receives in a week, storing PKG’s share of
user’s private key (a point on the underlying elliptic curve) in the same directory as
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the e-mails received in that week only marginally increases the storage requirements
allocated for that user. Once the user connects to the exchange server for the first
time in a week it downloads PKG’s share of the belonging private key for that week.
If the user has not connected to the e-mail server for more than a week, the e-mail
program downloads PKG’s share of the private key for previous weeks as well. Note
that these downloading operations are done transparently to the user or rather it
is pushed to the user by the e-mail server. By adding the user’s own share to the
PKG’s share, the user obtains the private key for the current week and will be able
to decrypt any message received that week. Note that when the need arises, for
instance by an explicit request from the user, PKG can re-generate its share of any
user’s private key.
Another approach in determining the validity period of the public keys is to give
the sender of the message as an option in e-mailing applications. This way, the
sender will choose whether it uses monthly or weekly public key of the recipient.
Our infrastructure can easily accommodate role-based messaging applications
as proposed in [14]. Instead of using names, e-mail addresses, pseudonyms, any
description for a role or time and space constraints can be used as a public key in
our infrastructure.
4.4 Key Revocation Problem
In the proposed IBE scheme, revocation becomes an issue in two different circum-
stances: i) a particular time-dependent private key, e.g. sQA, or ii) secret share of
any particular user, e.g. sA, is compromised. When the former happens, the adver-
sary can decrypt the messages intended for the corresponding user or sign messages
on behalf of that user until the expiration date of the corresponding public key. This
is the reason why we would like to use frequently changing public keys. The shorter
the validity period of a public key, the less likely the corresponding private key being
fallen in the hands of an adversary assuming that capturing a private key requires
substantial efforts. In addition, the damage is also minimized when a public key is
used only for short amount of time. In order to guarantee that no compromised key
is used in encryption or signature verification operations, the PKG can publish a
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(revocation) list of compromised keys. Compromised public keys can be extended
with a known public information to generate a new public/private key pair.
If a user compromise her share of the master secret, which we believe is less
likely than the former case, the situation must be handled in a different way. The
adversary that has the secret share can impersonate the corresponding user, decrypt
any messages intended for the user and sign messages on behalf the user. In addi-
tion, the adversary can generate a new private key in collaboration with the PKG.
Therefore, shortening the validity period does not remedy this situation. In this
case, the user must change its share and initiate a new registration phase. With the
new share of the master secret, the user implicitly invalidate the old one, with which
the adversary cannot extract the private keys. There is no need to keep revocation
lists since the user does not have to change its public key after the new share is
generated. Adversary revealing the compromised share to the PKG will, however,
result in loss of non-repudiation property.
4.5 Scalability
In order to improve the scalability, we can envisage an architecture where there are
many private key generators while a single RA is responsible for registering users by
associating them with an appropriate PKG. The RA shares the same master secret
with every PKG in a different way. A user that wants to register in the system
indicates the PKG it prefers to the RA which in turn uses it in the registration
protocol. The master secret key is determined by the RA and the first PKG in the
system; and a new PKG is introduced into the system by running a protocol similar
to the registration protocol as described in Figure 4.5. We assume that private key
generators are semi-honest and non-colluding.
26
PKG2 RA PKG1
1) E
RA
[r
1
-s
PKG2
]
2) E
PKG1
[r
1
-s
PKG2
+s
RA
+r
2
]
3) E
PKG1
[-s
PKG2
+s
RA
+r
2
]
4) E
PKG1
[-s
PKG2
+s
RA
+r
2
]
5) E
RA
[-s
PKG2
+r
2
+s]
Figure 4.5: Introducing a new PKG into the system
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Chapter 5
The Implementation
The proposed identity-based infrastructure is built by utilizing Miracl library[12]
and is integrated with one of the most used open-source mail applications, Mozilla
Thunderbird.
5.1 Multiprecision Integer and Rational Arithmetic
C/C++ Library
Multiprecision Integer and Rational Arithmetic C/C++ Library(Miracl) is a big
number library provided by Shamus Software Limited and maintains a rich platform
to design elliptic curve cryptography implementations. The main asset of of Miracl is
that the bilinear mapping functions and the elliptic curve operations are efficient and
fast when compared to other big number libraries. The underlying infrastructure of
Miracl is built by using C/C++ coding language. Our infrastructure is built upon
a supersingular elliptic curve with the equation y2 = x3 + 1 mod p where p has a
size of 512 bits so as to provide an equivalent security to 1024-bit RSA. In addition,
both Tate pairing and hash functions are provided by Miracl library.
5.2 Mozilla Thunderbird
IBE systems, as pointed out earlier, are convenient for messaging applications.
Therefore, a simplified version of the proposed infrastructure is integrated with one
of the widely used open-source e-mail applications, Mozilla Thunderbird. In order to
embed the proposed infrastructure in an e-mail application, Thunderbird provides
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a flexible and rich platform. Developing an extension requires a knowledge of XUL
and JavaScript languages. While XUL language is generally used to define new win-
dow elements such as bars, menu items or buttons on the user interface, JavaScript
is utilized to assign events on the created window elements and also executes the
underlying C++ built processes such as encryption and decryption routines.
Before building an extension, the development environment has to be prepared.
Preparing the development environment involves populating the appropriate exten-
sion folders with specific files. This extension (add-in) folder contains the following
items.
• /chrome.manifest: Specifies where the chrome files are located.
• /install.rdf: The description file of the extension.
• /locale/*:
• /locale/en-US: Contains translation for text string codes in *.xul files.
• /defaults/:
• /defaults/preferences/*.js: Contains
• /content/: Contains two types of files with the extensions, .xul and .js. While
xul file contains the definitions of user interface elements, such as buttons,
menu items; the javascript file is the script file in which the actions are defined.
• /skin/:
After the development environment is prepared, one may start developing the
extension by first writing the definition of the extension in the XML formatted
install.rdf file, which is shown below.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<RDF xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
xmlns:em="http://www.mozilla.org/2004/em-rdf#">
<Description about="urn:mozilla:install-manifest">
<em:id>encry@encry.org</em:id>
<em:name>encry</em:name>
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<em:version>1.0</em:version>
<em:creator>encry Team</em:creator>
<em:homepageURL>http://www.encry.org/</em:homepageURL>
<em:optionsURL>chrome://encry/content/options.xul</em:optionsURL>
<em:targetApplication>
<Description>
<em:id>{3550f703-e582-4d05-9a08-453d09bdfdc6}</em:id>
<em:minVersion>1.5</em:minVersion>
<em:maxVersion>2.0.0.*</em:maxVersion>
</Description>
</em:targetApplication>
</Description>
</RDF>
The description of the install.rdf is given in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: The Properties of Install.rdf
Tag The Functionality
xml version Defines the xml version of the document
id The ID of the extension, given in e-mail address for-
mat
name The name of the extension
version The version of the extension
creator String information that represents the the designer of
the extension
homepageURL Homepage URL of the extension
Description/id Thunderbird’s application ID
Description/minVersion The minimum version of the Thunderbird the exten-
sion can work with
Description/maxVersion The maximum version of the Thunderbird the exten-
sion can work with
The chrome.manifest file references the chrome, or namely, the source files, where
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the scripts and xul files defining the functionality of the extension, are located. A
sample of chrome.manifest file for the plug-in encry is shown in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: The chrome.manifest File
content encry content/
locale encry en-US locale/en-US/
locale edithtml en-US locale/en-US/
skin encry classic/1.0 skin/
overlay chrome://messenger/content/messenger.xul
chrome://encry/content/messengerOverlay.xul
overlay chrome://messenger/content/messageWindow.xul
chrome://encry/content/messengerOverlay.xul
overlay chrome://messenger/content/messengercompose/messengercompose.xul
chrome://encry/content/composeOverlay.xul
The locale folder shall include a folder, named en-US, in which the translation
of the text string codes in *.xul files are located. Every extension has an option
box that provides a user-friendly interface for the users, allowing to modify the
preferences of the extension. The structure and functionality of this box is provided
by the javascript files, located in the preferences folder. The functionality and
behavior of the extension are defined with the javascript and xul files, located in
the content folder. While the XUL file provides adding new user interface elements
on Thunderbird, the Javascript file contains the action and behavior information of
these elements together with the extension’s functionality.
5.3 The Integration of MIRACL and Thunder-
bird
As pointed out earlier, the implementation comprises two tiers, MIRACL and Mozilla
Thunderbird. While MIRACL covers the security aspect, Mozilla Thunderbird con-
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stitutes the communication part of the project. Since these two components are
implemented in different programming languages, it is also important to explain
how they are integrated to each other in order to conceive their cooperation.
In the implementation part of this thesis; three add-ins have been developed, for
the RA, the PKG and the user separately, since these entities have different roles.
Each plug-in contains the executable files and the plug-in source code. The c++
built processes, that involve the cryptographic operations, are invoked automatically
by Thunderbird whenever the appropriate action takes place. For instance, the
encryption process is called from Thunderbird, each time the user sends an email.
It is important to mention that the plug-in also serves as an environment to store
the cryptographic parameter files, such as private keys and public keys. As shown
in Figure 5.1, the entities communicate via mail server. The e-mail server plays the
central role and generally works as a bridge between PKG, RA and the user. In
addition, two additional email addresses have been registered for the RA and the
PKG, namely ‘ibe ra@sabanciuniv.edu’ and ‘ibe pkg@sabanciuniv.edu’.
Mail Server
PKGUser RA
SMTP
Add-in
SMTP
Add-inAdd-in
SMTP
Figure 5.1: The System Architecture
After the extension is installed all phases are handled automatically except for
the decryption phase. The specific details are given below:
1. Setup Phase: When started, both add-ins on RA and PKG’s side randomly
select secret numbers and each calculates their shares of the system public
key. The setup phase is initiated when the RA automatically sends its share
of the system public key to the PKG via an e-mail message whose subject is
‘IBE Setup’. The add-in on PKG’s side has an event listener which checks for
the sender and the subject field of the newly arrived mails. If the received
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mail’s subject is ‘IBE Setup’ and the sender is ‘ibe ra@sabanciuniv.edu’ then
PKG executes its setup phase and ends up with calculating the public key
of the system. We assume that the PKG and RA have a secure channel to
communicate.
2. Registration Phase: When a user installs the Modified Identity-based En-
cryption(MIBE) plug-in, the registration steps are transparently done and
automatically executed on each party. Specifically the registration phase is
initiated by the user’s plug-in when Thunderbird is firstly launched on user
side. The plug-in automatically selects the user secret share(sID) and the ran-
dom number, r1, encrypts the subtraction of these values and sends the result
to RA. If the user’s mail address is unique, RA adds the user’s mail address to
its database and executes the following registration phase steps. Otherwise,
if the user mail address is not unique, it sends an e-mail with the subject
‘REGISTRATION DENIED’ to the user and warns to register with another
e-mail address.
3. Encryption Phase: When a user clicks on the send button; the encryption
process in the add-in is called, the mail body is automatically encrypted and
sent to the recipient. The encryption is performed using enveloping method
whereby a symmetric secret key is encrypted by the public key of the recipi-
ent which is equal to its e-mail address concatenated with the date informa-
tion(Day.Month.Year).The body of the message is encrypted by the symmetric
key using AES.
4. Decryption Phase: Users can decrypt their messages by clicking on the
decrypt menu item as shown in Figure 5.2.
Since we do not employ a secure crypto module to guarantee a secure execution
of cryptographic primitives, we hardcoded the public key of the RA in the user
add-in program and do not allow users to change it. Similarly, the secret share
of the user sA is not kept in a place where the user cannot easily access. We did
not implement the user identification and pseudonym generation protocols. The
private key extraction protocol is implemented in a different manner from Figure
3.3. The PKG periodically e-mails its share of user private key to each user, from
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Figure 5.2: The Decrypt Menu Item
which the user add-in computes the private key of the user. The messages in all
the implemented protocols are sent as e-mails with a unique identifying description
in the subject field. The corresponding add-in programs constantly check for the
subject fields of every e-mail messages to take an appropriate action.
5.4 Performance
Intel Celeron 1.5 Ghz computer is used as a base platform together with its Windows
XP operating system. Table 5.31 features the execution times of the cryptographic
operations in different protocols for each party, namely PKG, RA and the user. The
numbers indicated below each party, show the execution times of the correspond-
ing processes, relevantly in terms of milliseconds. Clearly, our infrastructure not
only offers a secure infrastructure but also provides an efficient system with high
execution performance.
The data to be stored on each party is also another important aspect to be taken
into account since it heavily affects the implementation in terms of its performance.
The size of the data in bytes, to be stored on each entity, is shown in Table 5.4.
1Note that the communication latencies are excluded. Table 1 is constructed by running user
side only one time, considering the latency requirement on user side; and both PKG and RA 100
times, since throughput is a concern.
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Table 5.3: The Performance
Process PKG(ms) RA(ms) User(ms)
Computing PSY S 16 17 -
Registration 242 271 140
Private Key Extraction 16 - 20
Pseudonym Generation 16 - 60
Whereas the C++ built processes are indicated as executables, the parameters and
variables are stored in data files with the extension ‘.ibe’. It should also be pointed
out that the size of executable files may vary depending on the implementation and
deployment method. Supporting this fact, the larger size of database connection
executables deployed in PKG and RA side are introduced by their implementation
in C#.
Table 5.4: The File Storage
Entity File name File size(Mb)
PKG Data Files 2.39
Executables 16.6
RA Data Files 2.63
Executables 32.6
User Data Files 2.00
Executables 1.70
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this thesis, a new IBE infrastructure that is intended for utilization in messaging
applications is proposed. The proposed infrastructure aims to solve some inherent
drawbacks of the IBE systems while retaining their advantage. Key escrowing prob-
lem is solved by a method where users and the private key generator secret shares
the master secret key. The omniscient private key generator in classical IBE sys-
tems which knows all private keys is replaced by a semi-honest third party that does
not have information about these private keys. In the presence of the semi-honest
private key generator, it is possible to have anonymous and secure communication
under the non-collusion assumption. We also made investigations as to how the
non-repudiation property can be provided in our infrastructure. We implemented
the cryptographic protocols used in the proposed infrastructure and demonstrated
that computational requirements for the parties are acceptable. We also integrated
an e-mail system with the proposed infrastructure and are currently experimenting
with the implementation to evaluate its convenience to the users.
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